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Abstract. If we had to show the actuality of Pierre Janet, we should simply begin 
with the phenomenon of emotion, which is perceived today much more as an 
expression of consciousness than only as a physiological reaction. Where does 
this interest come from? How is it that emotion today is rather understood as 
implying also meaning and, therefore, consciousness? It seems this change is the 
result of a better understanding of emotion as an expressive sign of something 
other than a purely physiological signal, especially when it comes to anything other 
than the view of a bear, to use the famous example of William James.  
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 The genuine psychology which, by fear of metaphysics, had 
thrown itself in mathematics, in alleged brain anatomy, in a pseudo-
psychology of vasomotor, came back in the end to its true purpose, 
the study of human behaviour.  
(Janet 1975, T1, 203)  
 
(...) feelings, in particular, are not built with sensations.  
(Janet 1975, T2, 62) 
 
(...) scientific psychology must consider the psychological facts as 
actions and express them in terms of action.  
(Janet 1975, T2, 71) 
 
 
We will assume, as a guiding hypothesis, that today’s frenzy to 
studying emotion as meaning is more the congruent product of 
various psychological, artistic and philosophical movements stating 
there is a strong connection between the mind and the body, a 
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connection validated by varied experiences ranging from the 
psychedelic to the athlete, than those advanced by neurobiology. 
In fact, it seems that some neuroscientists concerned with 
psychological (Reuchlin 1995, 240) and sociological approaches 
have found themselves blocked when have tried to analysis what 
generates emotion besides its physiological stem. This indicates the 
great significance of consciousness, who becomes gradually aware 
of itself and continuously defines itself by its conduct.  
All these things were not unknown to Janet, hence his 
importance for the present day, and that contrary to what Jean-Paul 
Sartre thought, whose criticism has undoubtedly contributed to the 
sidelining of the janetienne analysis2 in addition to Freudianism, 
which subject consciousness to the unconscious3, a hierarchy which 
is now being challenged by cognitive psychology (Reuchlin 1995, 
246) and the psychology of motivation (Nuttin 1980, 26), both 
highlighting the conscious intervention of an active subject.  
Let us take the fragment below from Sartre as an example of his 
misunderstanding of the janetienne analysis: 
 
A theory of emotion which sought to restore the preponderant part played by 
the psyche would have to treat emotion as a kind of behaviour. Yet for all 
then, Janet is aware no less than James of the apparent disorder presented by 
every emotion. He, therefore, threats emotion as a behaviour that is less well 
adapted, or, if one prefers, a behaviour of disadaptation, a behaviour of defeat. 
When the task is to difficult and we cannot maintain the better behaviour 
appropriate to it, the psychic energy that has been released expands itself along 
another path; we adopt an inferior behaviour which necessitates a lesser 
psychic tension. Hence, for instance, is a girl whose father has just told her 
that he has some fear of paralysis. She falls to the ground, prey to a violent 
emotion which returns a few days later with the same violence, and which 
finally obliges her to seek help from the doctors. In the course of her 
treatment, she confesses that the thought of nursing her father and leading 
the austere life of a nurse has suddenly appeared to her as insupportable. Here, 
then, the emotion represents an attitude of defeat; it is the substitute for the 
‘non-maintainable-conduct-of-a-nurse’. 
Similarly, in his work Obsession and Psychasthenia, Janet cites the cases of 
several patients who, having come to make confessions to him, could not 
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finish their confessions, but broke down in tears, sometimes even bringing on 
a nervous crisis. Here again, the required behaviour is to difficult. The 
whipping, on the nervous crisis, represents a behaviour of defeat, which 
substitutes itself for the former by a deviation. (…) 
 
But what are we to understand by it? If we regard the individual objectively as 
a system of behaviours, and if the deviation takes place automatically, then 
there is no defeat, it does not exist; all that happens is the replacement of a 
kind of behaviour by diffusion of organic manifestations. If emotion is to have 
the psychic significance of a defeat, the consciousness must intervene and 
confer that signification upon it, there must be conscious retention of the 
emotion as a defeat precisely in relation to that superior behaviour. But that 
would be to give consciousness a constitutive function, which Janet will not 
have at any price. (Sartre: 1962, 35 – 38) 
 
This last statement of Sartre is wrong. Janet gives, on the contrary, 
a “constitutive” role to consciousness, which can be observed even 
in the example that Sartre advanced. The nervous crisis is less a 
“deviation” than a solution expressing the refusal to meet the 
prospective father’s wish to have to take care of him. The fact of 
rolling on the ground is the immediate affirmation and the one which 
triggered it the reflected affirmation - if we use the distinction between 
these two types of conduct made by Janet (Janet 1975, T1, 207) 
In other words, the immediate assertion, rolling on the ground, 
constitutes, from the viewpoint of the subject, a solution, that is to 
say, a decision of action, a reflected affirmation, which the girl 
acknowledges it only later.  
What else, therefore, consciousness could be if not an act of 
reflected affirmation, as it is, for instance, the girls’ decision of 
throwing herself and rolling on the ground to refuse to submit 
herself to what it is believed to be the wish of the other. She believes 
indeed that if his father tells her about his paralysis, then she must 
turn into his nurse. Hence the significative “solution” – meaning 
that it shall be seen as a sign, that it designates, in fact, that 
something which troubles. There is a twofold temporality here. Not 
perceiving it would merely men playing the words instead of seeing 
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consciousness as constitutive behaviour, as Sartre himself defines it 
in his text.  
Let us now return on this issue more rigorous. Does Janet use 
precisely the term “consciousness” in his work? Yes, when he 
defines what the “psychology of action” means: 
 
In this psychology of action, it is necessary to make room for the 
consciousness, space which can be suppressed when we speak of inferior 
animals, but which cannot be ignored when we speak of men or even of 
animals with superior intelligence. But we must speak of the phenomenon of 
consciousness as a particular type of conduct, as a complication of the act 
which is superadded to elementary actions. We can reach it by studying the 
elementary social behaviours and especially the feelings that are, as we shall 
see, regulations of the action, reactions of the individual to his own actions. 
(Janet 1975, 175) 
 
Thus, consciousness proves to be a “specific action”, a 
“complication of the act” that “superimposes itself on particular 
actions”. This “addition”, Janet says, is perceivable when the 
“elementary social behaviours” are studied, especially “feelings that 
are (…) regulations of the action, reactions of the individual to his 
own actions”. Janet considers the action of consciousness as a 
regulation of the same nature as that emerging through the 
formation of feeling. 
One question arises at this point: does the very fact of regulating 
means that consciousness is indeed constitutive to behaviour, as 
Sartre believed although he did not accept to see it in Janet? For 
Sartre, it seems that consciousness is a particular capability able to 
“confer meanings” (as Husserl had demarcated in his Logical 
Investigations, not to mention Hegel, Kant, and, in fact, all 
philosophy). 
 
If we objectively consider the individual as a system of behaviours, and if the 
derivation is automatic, failure is nothing, it does not exist, there is simply a 
replacement of behaviour by a diffuse set of organic manifestations. For 
emotion to have the psychical meaning of failure, it is necessary that the 
consciousness intervene and confer meaning to it, it is necessary that it retains 
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as a possibility the superior conduct and that it perceives emotion precisely as 
a failure by relating it to this superior type of conduct. But it would give 
consciousness a constitutive role, which Janet does not want at any price. 
 
For Janet, consciousness is the basis of the regulations of action, 
namely of feelings. It is even a necessary condition for the 
psychology of action to exist.  
Janet delves deeper into this question by stating that, if feeling 
turns out to be an “elementary social behaviour”, this requires a 
thorough study of its foundation, that means analyzing the sense of 
feeling, of its regulation and thus of the very organization of 
consciousness. This is what Janet emphasizes in defining the second 
ground condition for the psychology of action (consciousness being 
the first; see the quote above): 
 
A second condition is that in this description of behaviours, one must be 
concerned with superior behaviours, beliefs, reflections, reasoning, 
experiences. These facts have usually been expressed in terms of thoughts; in 
order to preserve the same language in psychological science, they must be 
expressed in terms of actions. (...). In psychology, we must abandon the 
anatomical and physiological pretensions and humbly limit ourselves to be a 
psychologist always speaking the language of conduct and action. This is 
possible even when it comes to the highest behaviours taking into account an 
essential behaviour, characteristic of man, that of language. (Janet 1975, 175) 
 
We cannot be clearer as to what is Janet induces as a part of 
consciousness (even though he does not mention it every five 
minutes) when it comes to higher behaviours, especially that of 
language. On this topic, Janet adds immediately after: 
 
Language is a particular action of man, which is, in the beginning, a real 
external action, that is to say, an act of a subject that determines reactions to 
others. But language can very easily become an internal action, that is to say, 
an act of a subject that only determines reactions in himself. I tried to consider 
the very different behaviours between external behaviours and thoughts, 
those in which language intervenes as an intermediary; they allowed me to 
objectively approach the highest psychological phenomena, those that are 
most intimate of man, and express them in terms of actions. This psychology, 
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we can call it psychology of behaviour to indicate that it is about an extended 
and higher form of behavioural psychology. This is how we should study the 
psychological issues of the sick. 
 
To better understand how Janet brings consciousness into the 
formation of emotions, let us consider another case, of a woman 
who, Janet says: 
 
(…) believes, in her delirium, that she is transformed into a lion, that she is a 
lioness. She walks on all fours, roars, scratches a drawer with her claws, takes 
out photographs, chooses photographs of children and devours them. Can we 
imagine a more beautiful symbolism and absurdity? But when it comes to 
dinner, she refuses papers and eats her soup with a spoon.  
A woman in a crisis of doubt wrote me the following letter: ‘I am again very 
unhappy, unable to write or read a word. I have before me a letter from my 
daughter and I cannot read it because I absolutely do not understand how 
black dots on paper may bear someone’s thoughts. Could you write me a note 
to tell me when could I come to see you?’ But finally! If she cannot understand 
a written word, why is she writing to me and why is she asking me for a written 
answer? In all these innumerable cases, the disorder exists only in the acts of 
reflected belief, in the reflected establishment of a relation between the speech 
and the action made by the members. When the question of belief does not 
arise, when it comes to the act done only with the members, there is no 
trouble. (Janet 1975, 205) 
 
Janet thus establishes a link between a word and an action through 
the reflection constituted as a belief and which will materialize itself 
in action, that to refuse to read. It is necessary the intervention of 
another process, of reason, to succeed in getting out of it. Janet also 
reports the following case: 
 
Delboeuf used to describe this amusing experience: he had suggested to a 
sleepwalker that her head had been cut off and that henceforth she had to live 
without the head. The poor girl was walking around the room, feeling her 
neck, never raising her fingers above the imaginary cut. She was looking at 
herself in the mirror, saying, ‘It’s very ugly and sad to no more have a head’. 
An assistant awkwardly remarked that to see in the mirror and speak one has 
to have eyes, a mouth and, consequently, the head. This remark made the 
somnambulist very uneasy and awakened her, but she had not previously felt 
the complete opposite of the two parts of the belief. (…) 
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 1 (3) 2018 
33 
In order for the affirmation and belief be stopped when the terms imply 
opposing and irreconcilable actions, a new act must be added to the simple 
assertive belief. It is necessary that the thought of a rule come to oppose the 
affirmation. This act is performed correctly only at this rational stage when 
the mind has become capable of giving force to logical or moral formulas and 
of transforming them into orders. We do not have to study these higher stages 
but already at the considered stage of the logical and moral rules, it can have 
some importance. (Janet 1975, 209) 
 
Let us remember that the rational stage is that moment when “the 
spirit has become capable of giving strength to logical or legal 
formulas and of turning them into powerful orders”. Janet notes, 
however, that the premises exist as to the belief staffing to logical or 
legal formulas, which he calls the reflected belief. 
Janet thus establishes a scale of meaning (Janet 1975, 223) that, 
contrary to what Sartre believed, complicates the organization of 
consciousness4. The idea that we are always rational seemed 
incongruous to him: 
 
(...) The principles of reason necessarily apply, it was said because it is 
impossible to have two contradictory behaviours simultaneously. The physical 
laws of the movements and the psychological laws of the beliefs were 
completely confounded. (Janet 1975, 208) 
 
Hence the act of observing the non-application of the principles of 
reason over each one’s consciousness (what Janet called the assertive 
stage, where assertive combines the real and the imaginary and his 
trouble: the belief pithiatic (Janet 1975, 210)). Janet also writes: 
 
The reflected belief is formed through discussion with the other members of 
society, a discussion which ends up becoming internal in an isolated individual 
but always retains its primitive character of social discussion. The other socii, 
to designate them with the expression used by Mr Baldwin, opposed to the 
temptation of affirming their own beliefs. These are not always individual, 
they are often common to many and constitute the beliefs of society. He, who 
tries to support and defend a different belief, learns to his cost that it is 
dangerous to contradict common beliefs.  
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This rule of social concordance, which imposes a certain harmony in the 
beliefs of a social group, will become, at the rational stage, the starting point 
of the principle of non-contradiction: it will become forbidden to contradict 
oneself as to contradict the others without reason. But already at the reflected 
stage this rule intervenes at least from time to time and determines a certain 
coherence of beliefs. (Janet 1975, 209 - 210) 
 
We shall observe that apprehending the significance as a comprehensive 
scale of the endowment of meaning is close to the broad definition that 
Max Weber gives to the term “reason” in his Sociology5. 
For Weber, it is indeed to widen the horizon (to include the 
irrational as a “significant set” (Weber 1995, 35)) by considering that 
although behaviours can be contradictory, they must be perceived 
from the moment when they make sense for the actor; on the other 
hand, that on a completely different scale, that of reason as universal 
thought, such behaviours cannot last either because they prevent the 
advancement of a development or because they compete with other 
behaviours that are much more adequate in the organization of the 
action. 
For instance, as Janet observed above, the distinction (and not the 
irreconcilable separation) within reason itself, taken in the broad 
sense of significate between the logic of the excluded third (which, 
historically speaking, produced the scientific and technical 
methodology) and the logic of belief, can very well accommodate, at 
least to a certain extent, with the contradictory rules of behaviour 
and, thus, of a dissociated organization of acts of consciousness and 
their translation, in terms of actions, whether it is an emotion or a 
drive. 
We then see that the challenge for consciousness and behaviour 
resides in scheduling the stages of apprehension of belief as a synthesis. When 
this weakens is not possible, dissonances going up to dissociation 
disorder, when the last is not resolved, are observed. 
 In The Psychological Automatism, Janet had well seen this 
perspective in all its asperity (Conclusion, Chapter III, Second Part 
488). 
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The mental disintegration, the formation of successive and simultaneous 
personalities in the same individual, the automatic functioning of these various 
psychological groups isolated from each other are not artificial things, bizarre 
results of experimental manoeuvers. These are perfectly real and natural things 
that experience allows us to discover and study, although it does not create 
them. (Janet 1998, 488) 
 
In the Conclusion of the Chap. IV (Second Part), Janet adds: 
 
How could a psychologist like Moreau (from Tours) write this astonishing 
sentence: ‘In becoming an idiot, a subject goes through a psychocerebral state 
which, while continuing to develop, should make him a man of genius (in 
Psychologie morbide, 71). How could he believe that the diseases of the nervous 
system and even madness could favour the development of intelligence? It is 
probably because of the word ‘excitement’ that he constantly uses to designate 
madness. No, whatever the analogies in external circumstances could be, 
madness and genius are two extreme and opposite terms in all psychological 
developments. The whole history of madness, as Baillarger said and, after him, 
many other alienists, is only the description of the psychological automatism 
left to itself, and this automatism, in all its manifestations, depends on the 
current weakness of synthesis which is moral weakness itself, the 
psychological misery.  
Genius, on the contrary, is a power of synthesis capable of forming entirely 
new ideas, which no previous science could have foreseen; it is the last degree 
of moral power. Ordinary men oscillate between these two extremes, more 
determined and automatic if their moral force is weaker, worthier of being 
considered as free and moral beings when the small moral force that they have 
in them and whose nature we do not know is growing further. (Janet 1998, 
525 – 526) 
 
What should be concluded from all these? Firstly, the fact that it is 
necessary to distinguish the necessity of the synthesis and the fact 
that we act in a non-identical manner according to our character (or 
conation for Reuchlin) and the historical conditions in which we live.  
If the synthesis is essential, syntheses are possible and we should 
define how can they evaluate themselves from their singularity, 
especially today, in the media age, where the multiplication of 
realities and references attracts and produces compensations that 
further complicate the problem.  
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The role of an objective evaluation of the action in the light of 
Pierre Janet’s psychology of behaviour becomes, once again, an 
indispensable reference framework recognized more and more at 
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